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When John Langshaw Austin died in  he had published only 
seven papers, together with a translation into English of Frege’s Die 
Grundlagen der Arithmetik. But at his death he was pre-eminent 
among Oxford philosophers. Memoirs of him published at or near 
that time mention him in the same breath as Wittgenstein, as his 
equal in inﬂuence and philosophical importance. This conjunction 
is echoed in some popular presentations of the history of mid-cen­
tury philosophy, which lump Austin and Wittgenstein together as 
the leaders of the ‘linguistic philosophy’ or ‘ordinary language’ phi­
losophy that dominated England at that time. 
One might feel now, nearly forty years later, that Austin’s impact 
on philosophical life has diminished sharply. While there continues 
to be a vibrant research community dedicated to the exposition and 
criticism of Wittgenstein’s work, including the vast nachlass, there is 
no similar project dedicated to Austin. In part, that must be due to 
the fact recorded by those who praised him in life and death, that his 
intellectual dominance came from the context of his teaching, and 
his guidance of his colleagues and pupils rather than through any 
published work or developed thesis or doctrine which he wished to 
propound and his students to promulgate. Whatever the exact ex­
planation, an unfortunate consequence of this is that there has been 
some tendency in recent years to dismiss Austin as having an over­
blown reputation: Colin McGinn, in his review of Warnock’s book 
on Austin (‘Reputations’, London Review of Books, November  
), surmises improbably that Warnock intended to deﬂate Aus­
tin’s reputation through his patient criticism of Austin’s views, and 
himself implies that the deﬂation is overdue. 
It can be of no help here that there is a popular conception of 
what ‘linguistic philosophy’ in Austin’s hands comprised: a some­
what ad hoc and pedantic focus on how words are actually used in 
ordinary or common language; an obstinate refusal to look at the 
phenomena which genuinely motivate philosophical concerns, and 
an insistence that all one must do is use one’s words carefully.  If that 
is all that Austin’s philosophical method amounts to, it would be di­
ﬃcult to respect it: the fetish of sticking with what we have so far 
been content to say is stultifying in areas of investigation where 
there may be innovation and advance.  Surely we do not want to 
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deny the sciences the right to introduce new vocabulary. Why then 
should philosophers be restrained?  One might also harbour suspi­
cions of the method so characterised: with what right can someone 
assume themselves to be an authority on what can or can’t be said, 
or what does or does not make sense? How could one hope that the 
investigations into usage could aspire to any generality that would 
apply to the way people talk beyond Oxford common rooms. 
But the characterisation is just a caricature, and Sense & Sensibil­
ia is a good place to start to reveal quite what a travesty that depic­
tion of Austin’s intentions and methods is. Based as it is on a series 
of lectures that Austin gave annually in Oxford from  to , 
the book takes us closer to Austin’s actual style of instruction which 
is so often commented on by his defenders, than do the seven papers 
he published in his lifetime, written as they were for special occa­
sions or symposia. No one who casts a fresh eye over the lectures 
will miss the keen sense that Austin has of the phenomena with 
which he is concerned.  As Austin himself puts the point in ‘Truth’, 
‘It takes two to make a truth’:1 his focus is not solely on language, 
but, in part through a focus on use of language, the phenomena 
talked about. 
The set of lectures is an apt object of investigation for another 
reason as well.  It is now ﬁfty years since Austin ﬁrst gave these lec­
tures. When we look back to the mid-century we can see a very dif­
ferent landscape within which philosophical debate took place. The 
concerns of those writing about knowledge and reality at that time 
focused on the ‘problems of perception’ associated with the argu­
ment from illusion. Any discussion of the nature of knowledge 
would likely have to be a discussion also of the nature of reality 
known, with a focus on what is to be said about the nature of per­
ception and the knowing mind. The blending of these diﬀerent 
themes is central to the varieties of phenomenalism, the elaboration 
or criticism of which was a central concern of many of these discus­
sions. 
If one looks to recent discussions of knowledge, of metaphysics, 
and of mind one will ﬁnd much more division of labour. For few, if 
any, writers on knowledge in recent years has the nature of percep­
tion been a dominant concern. For many philosophers, it is an im­
portant dogma that one needs carefully to separate issues in the 
theory of knowledge from issues surrounding general metaphysics 
or ontology. In place of the dominance of phenomenalism, we now 
ﬁnd a general assumption of physicalism in some form or other. 
1. (Austin b), p., f.. 
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When we turn to perception in particular, we see this allied with the 
repudiation of any form of sense-datum theory as traditionally con­
ceived. 
Since Austin is often presented in memoirs of him as a great in­
novator who is concerned to brush away the cobwebs of the as­
sumed terms of debate, it is tempting to see these lectures as a key 
point in the rejection of the more traditional debate about the na­
ture of perception, turning on the contrast of appearance and reali­
ty, together with a dismissal of the alleged consequences of that 
contrast for our conception of our knowledge of the world or of the 
world we thereby know. One might then hope to explain the con­
tours of the shift between the concerns dominant in mid-century 
and those that obsess us now through looking at this work. We may 
expect to get a better sense of where we have come from, and to 
where we may be heading. 
In fact, as I shall argue, the lessons to be learned here are com­
plex. Austin can be seen as marking a big divide between recent 
concerns and earlier ones, but the reasons he has for rejecting his 
predecessors are more local to his time than we might have expect­
ed. We can see important themes which link him to some recent de­
bates about knowledge and perception, but when we do so we ﬁnd 
that that emphasises more of a continuity with the traditional de­
bate than Austin himself would have been prepared to acknowledge. 
1. Sense & Sensibilia comprises eleven chapters, all deriving from the 
lectures that Austin gave.  Some of the material, particularly towards 
the beginning is in a stable form from when the lectures were ﬁrst 
given, but the later material is in more sketchy a form drawn from 
annotations to late revisions of the earlier notes. Some of the mate­
rial lectured on, that relating to Austin’s views of truth, are excised 
from the published version, since they overlap with the paper ‘Un­
fair to Facts’ to be found in the Philosophical Papers. 
Austin’s central concern in the lectures is with: 
The general doctrine… [that] we never see otherwise perceive (or 
“sense”), or anyhow never directly perceive or sense, material objects 
(or material things), but only sense-data (or our own ideas, impres­
sions, sensa, sense-perceptions, percepts etc.)2 
And swiftly he lets us know that his 
…general opinion about this doctrine is that it is a typically scholas­
tic view, attributable, ﬁrst, to an obsession with a few particular 
words, the uses of which are over-simpliﬁed, not really understood 
2. (Austin ), p. . 
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or carefully studied or correctly described; and second to an obses­
sion with a few (and nearly always the same) half-studied “facts”.3 
In the lectures he wishes to take on a whole tradition of debate 
about perception and reject not just one party to the debate, but the 
whole issue itself.  In fact, his focus within the course of lectures is 
principally on AJ Ayer’s The Foundations of Empirical Knowledge, 
and to a much lesser extent HH Price’s Perception, the ﬁnal chapter 
acting almost as an epilogue, applying similar criticisms to War­
nock’s attempt to rehabilitate the doctrine of sense-data as the im­
mediate objects of perception in his book Berkeley.4  As many 
commentators have noted, two of these texts had been published 
some ten to ﬁfteen years before Austin began to lecture on the topic, 
so he was not directly engaging views presented contemporaneous 
with his criticisms of them. Nonetheless, Austin assures his readers 
that the texts he is concerned with are ‘the best available expositions 
of the approved reasons for holding theories which are at least as old 
as Heraclitus’ (p.). The intention then is to oﬀer a critical overview 
of long standing concerns with appearance and reality through fo­
cusing on these particular examples. 
In his monograph on Austin, Warnock characterises the lectures 
as ‘almost throughout undeviatingly negative, critical, even polemi­
cally critical’.5  It is tempting, then, to evaluate the signiﬁcance of the 
work solely in terms of its negative theses and attacks on both Ayer, 
and the tradition he is taken to represent, and to look to the work’s 
legacy as the general rejection of the doctrines that Austin attacks. 
Ayer himself discerned seventeen diﬀerent arguments propounded 
by Austin against sense-data in the book.6  However, we can distil 
from this four main lines of critique that Austin puts forward: 
. He is keen to reject the dichotomy between sense-data and materi­
al objects as ill-constructed: some entities will fall on neither side; 
. The argument from illusion is variously treated as involving a 
conﬂation of illusion with delusion, or as trading on some fallacious 
or unconvincing assumption; 
. Our ordinary terms for talking about perception, and the look, or 
the appearance of things, or how things seem are indicated to be in 
good order and capable of being used to make much ﬁner distinc­
tions than the philosophers’ terms of art ‘sense-data’ and ‘material 
object’; 
3. Op. cit. p. . 
4. (Ayer ), (Price ), (Warnock ). 
5. (Warnock ), p.. 
6. (Ayer a), p.. 
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. The root of the whole debate and problem is diagnosed as a con­
cern with incorrigibility, and the need to ﬁnd propositions which 
would be incorrigible on all occasions, and which could act as the 
certain foundations for empirical knowledge; a concern which is it­
self hopeless and ill-founded. 
If we just stick with these four central claims, one might be tempted 
to think that Austin has at least been highly inﬂuential in Sense & 
Sensibilia whatever the merits of his case really are.  For, one can ﬁnd 
almost no one now who is prepared to talk of sense-data, or posit 
such things as the immediate objects of perceptual awareness, and 
fewer still who are prepared to embrace Ayer’s phenomenalism. 
Sense-data are not now taken to be the focus of debate about the na­
ture of perception, a commitment to them is taken rather to indicate 
that a philosopher must have gone wrong in their reasoning.  The 
argument from illusion is introduced as a piece of clearly fallacious 
reasoning which will lead one to accept the existence of such ridicu­
lous entities as sense-data.  Where a central tenor of the traditional 
debate is an anxiety about the revision of our common sense beliefs 
about the world and our relation to it, any such anxiety seems to 
have been swept away in recent discussion. Although the search for 
incorrigible truths has not entirely abated, few now are prepared to 
endorse any form of simple foundationalism in the theory of knowl­
edge, with certain knowledge of one’s own experiences as at the 
base. 
In his Dewey Lectures, Hilary Putnam suggests a converse read­
ing of Austin. He does not emphasise the negative elements in Aus­
tin’s work, but rather the continuity  of a certain positive 
commitment he ﬁnds in James, Austin and which he himself wishes 
to identify with: ‘Sense & Sensibilia represents the most powerful de­
fense of what I am calling “natural realism” in the history of philos­
ophy’.7  With respect to the negative claims that Austin makes in 
defending this alleged ‘natural realism’, Putnam complains that Aus­
tin’s lessons have been ignored or responded to ‘only minimally’. 
Given our earlier observations, Putnam’s comments might seem 
to miss the point. For philosophers now repudiate all talk of sense­
data, and ridicule the argument from illusion, just as Austin invites 
them to do.  What more could Putnam demand of them? But I do 
think that there is something right about Putnam’s complaints here. 
Putnam’s main concern is that where philosophers have come to re­
ject a commitment to sense-data, this rejection is the most shallow 
form of religious conversion, repudiating no more than a form of 
7. (Putnam ), p.. 
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words. In general, those who deny that there are sense-data are still 
prepared to accept a view of our relation to the world which intro­
duces, ‘sensory experiences as intermediaries between us and the 
world…[making] it impossible to see how persons can be in genu­
ine cognitive contact with a world at all’.8 In many recent discus­
sions of knowledge and perception, one can ﬁnd a form of the 
argument from illusion playing a central role, and it is clear that 
Putnam wishes to reject that. 
At the same time, I think that it is clear that the reasons that phi­
losophers now have for rejecting sense-data, particularly those asso­
ciated with a commitment to physicalism, are distinct from any 
Austin put forward. So we cannot think of these recent views as 
Austin’s legacy.  However, whether or how Putnam’s position—his 
rejection of currently favoured arguments from illusion—derives 
from Austin’s position is moot. For the assumptions which drive 
these more recent debates are somewhat beyond the scope of Aus­
tin’s discussion in Sense & Sensibilia.  If Putnam is right to identify 
his views with Austin’s, then this must come from the more positive 
elements in Austin relating to perception and knowledge, and not 
the kinds of scathing criticism, that commentators have tended to 
focus on. 
I suggest ﬁrst that if we assess Austin’s negative charges then we 
shall ﬁnd they are at best successful against a limited range of oppo­
nents.  The arguments turn on certain assumptions that these peo­
ple made which are of little interest to us now.  Partly as a 
consequence of this, Austin’s assessment of the traditional problems 
of perception and the debate that surrounds them is not convincing, 
as Myles Burnyeat has rightly complained.9 So not only is it the case 
that the negative elements of Austin’s view have few traces in recent 
thought, it is not clear that they deserve to. On the other hand, 
there is much in Austin’s positive views that have been unjustly ne­
glected and which do form an interesting connection with more re­
cent concerns in the theory of perception and knowledge. 
2. There are two inter-related complaints that Austin makes against 
the tradition of debate about sense-data: ﬁrst, that the notions of 
sense-datum and material thing are not well-deﬁned; and second, 
that there is no argument from illusion that can show that we direct­
ly perceive only sense-data. 
At the outset Austin insists: 
8. Op. cit. p.. 
9. See (Burnyeat ). 
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One of the most important things to grasp is that these two terms, 
‘sense-data’ and ‘material things’, live by taking in each other’s wash­
ing—what is spurious is not one term of the pair but the antithesis 
itself. There is no one kind of thing we ‘perceive’ but many different 
kinds, the number being reducible if at all by scientiﬁc investigation 
and not by philosophy…(p..) 
Certainly one aspect of this attack is a methodological pessimism 
about philosophers’ abilities to introduce technical terms which 
pick out genuine kinds of phenomena.  If one is more optimistically 
inclined about philosophical theorising, then one might think that 
the success of a given vocabulary is to be assessed relative to the 
fruits of theorising involving it, and so one cannot simply adopt an 
antecedent scepticism about the possibility of successfully introduc­
ing such terms. But in this particular case, there are reasons to side 
with Austin which do not require such general pessimism. And 
what is of interest in this, is to note how those reasons limit the 
scope of Austin’s challenge, and the force of his criticisms when 
ranged against the tradition as a whole of discussing sense-data. 
Now, if the introduction of these terms is to work, we should ex­
pect that one or other of the two terms should act as the kind term, 
its dual being used simply to gather up all things which fail to count 
as being of that kind. Austin’s complaint in this passage is really that 
neither term can occupy that central role: when we focus on materi­
al things we are to treat them simply as non-sense-data, but when 
we turn to sense-data, we can make no more sense of them than as 
being non-material things. 
With respect to the ﬁrst half of the complaint, there does seem to 
be much justice to what Austin has to say.  We think we can see such 
things as mirror-images, rainbows, shadows, holes, the Aurora Bo­
realis; we can detect scents; listen to the voices of the choir; the rus­
tling of the leaves. None of these things are we deﬁnitely inclined to 
classify as material entities.  So if the notion of material object is to 
carry the connotations of being made of matter or stuﬀ, then these 
objects of sense ought to be included among sense-data and not ma­
terial things. But they then fail to possess one of the key connota­
tions of sense-data that so exercise sense-datum theorists: privacy to 
one observer, and an exclusion from a shared world independent of 
any particular observer’s investigations. So it would seem that the 
only obvious mark which will group all of these things together as 
material objects and not as sense-data is just that we take them to be 
examples of those things which we can perceive, and which we to­
gether can on occasion come to perceive. The owner of the laundry 
must then be the term ‘sense-datum’ and not ‘material object’. 
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Yet it is less clear that Austin’s second charge is correct. Why 
can’t Austin’s opponent seek to introduce the term ‘sense-datum’ in 
the following kind of way? First, grant certain assumptions.  Sup­
pose one thinks, admittedly improbably, that even in cases of total 
hallucination where it may seem to one as if one sees a pig when 
there is no pig there to be seen, there must be something of which 
one is aware. The term ‘sense-datum’ will be introduced to pick out 
such entities. But is there anything that such entities will have in 
common which could ground the use of the term? Suppose one 
thinks, in addition, that one can bring about visual hallucinations of 
pigs just by appropriate stimulation of a subject’s visual cortex. 
Then we might reason that our causal action on the subject’s brain 
was (causally) suﬃcient to bring about the hallucination. In doing 
this, surely we acted only on the physical (or rather, neurophysiolog­
ical) states of the subject and through that their mental state. We 
have not acted on anything non-physical and non-mental. So if, as 
we assumed above, there must be something which the subject is 
aware of in having the hallucination, then that thing must itself be 
dependent on one’s state of hallucinating.  For if the object was not 
so dependent, then merely causing the mental state, the hallucinat­
ing, would not by itself have been suﬃcient to bring about the 
awareness of the object in question—instead one would have need­
ed to bring about a correlation between that object and the subject’s 
state of mind, just as in cases of veridical perception one needs to 
bring about a correlation between a pig in the subject’s environment 
and the subject. So, if we make a certain general empirical assump­
tion about what we can or cannot cause, then the sense-datum theo­
rist will have speciﬁc reason to suppose that the objects of awareness 
in cases of hallucination are mind-dependent: they depend for their 
existence and character on the act of being aware of them, and being 
presented with them as being thus and so. This then provides a gen­
eral feature which all sense-data may be thought to possess: they are 
those items whose existence is dependent on a particular subject’s 
awareness of them. Public objects of perception, even such phe­
nomena as rainbows, will not be dependent for their existence on 
any one individual’s given experience. 
One can question the assumptions at play here, and in particular 
one may well question the ﬁrst assumption about the need for an 
object of awareness for all experiences, whether perceptions or hal­
lucinations. There may yet be other problems with the argument, 
even if one is prepared to grant such assumptions. It would be be­
side the point somewhat to reﬂect on the ways in which the view is 
ﬂawed and how it could be reﬁned, for the issues then raised would 
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be inconsequential to our main concerns. For such an account of 
how we could give the sense-datum/material object contrast sub­
stance is not the target of any of Austin’s criticisms. Price would not 
have found this way of introducing the term acceptable, and though 
Ayer used it in a somewhat diﬀerent way, the account sketched 
above would not ﬁnd his favour either. 
The ﬁrst point to make about Price’s use of the term, in which he 
follows Moore, is that he means by ‘sense-datum’ not something 
non-physical but merely whatever it is that occupies a certain role: 
that of being given or present to the mind in states of sensing.10 He 
then takes himself to have an argument to show that such things 
cannot at any rate ever be identiﬁed with physical objects.  However, 
given that Price did think that all sense-data were in fact non-physi­
cal, the most important point to note is that he denied that it made 
any sense to aﬃrm of them that they are mind-dependent. Consid­
er: 
It has often been thought that sense-data ‘exist only for a mind’.  My 
sense-data, it is said, exist only for me, and yours only for you. This 
phrase may be taken in two ways.  It may mean that sense-data de­
pend for their existence or for their qualities upon our awareness of 
them; this proposition is a gross absurdity, incompatible with the 
very connotations of the terms ‘existent’, ‘awareness’, and ‘quali­
ties’…11 
So Price has no easy way of deﬁning sense-data as just those things 
which are dependent for their existence on any state of awareness of 
a subject. Of course, he did not take seriously the thought that non­
physical sense-data might have an existence entirely independent of 
our sensing of them. But his account requires that we accept a com­
plex interplay of causal and other dependencies between physical 
objects of perception, sense-data and the mind: 
It looks as if a sense-datum is only not an event inhering in any one 
thing, because it is so intimately related to several diﬀerent things at 
once: on the one hand, to the thing to which it ‘belongs’ and which 
it  enables us to be perceptually conscious of;  on the other, to the 
brain and the mind of the sentient. Thus the colour-expanse which 
10. Of course, to suppose that there must always be an occupant of this role, whenever one has 
an experience, is thereby to make the implausible assumption that there is always something 
which one senses, when one has an experience. Even if one were prepared to grant that 
assumption, one should also note that Price has no sound justiﬁcation for the assumption that 
there is a common role for objects of awareness to play, although his deﬁnition of ‘sense­
datum’ requires that assumption. 
11. (Price ), p.; cf. here (Moore ); and Prichard in ‘The Sense-Datum Fallacy’, in 
(Prichard a), where he argues from the non-independence of the objects of sensations, to 
our lack of knowledge or acquaintance with them. 
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I am acquainted with when the tree is present to my senses is a mem­
ber of at least two distinct complexes.12 
But this makes it look as if the answer to the question, ‘What kind of 
thing is a sense-datum?’ is to be answered by looking to a general 
theory of perception which relates the conditions of perception and 
the structure of the brain to episodes of sensing.  It is as if we have 
here a theory whose terms will come to have content through its 
empirical application. Unfortunately for Price there seems to be no 
hope of any such theory gaining empirical footing, so it seems as if 
there can be no satisfactory answer to the question at hand.13 
Ayer is not happy with the position that Price lands himself in. 
On Price’s account it looks as if it should be a substantive issue 
about what kinds of things they are which fulﬁl the presentation role 
of sense-data. Yet, for all of Price’s apparent convictions about the 
matter, his theory will simply be unable to answer it. Ayer’s attempt 
in The Foundations of Empirical Knowledge is to remove the appear­
ance of there being any substantive issue here at all. He wants to 
deny that the issue between a naïve view of perception, and the 
kinds of phenomenalisms or representative realisms that Price and 
C.D. Broad carefully distinguish and discuss involve a meaningful 
debate of substance.14  As a consequence, in his discussion of the ar­
gument from illusion he is keen to emphasise that we should see 
that it is merely a matter of decision whether we decide to speak in 
terms of sense-data or not. 
Ayer does not have Price’s reasons for denying the mind-depend­
ence of (non-physical) sense-data. Nevertheless he does not avail 
himself of the means of ﬁxing the term by reference to mind-de­
pendence in the way suggested earlier.  For to do so would require 
taking seriously the picture of bringing about hallucinations 
sketched above, which mixes elements of common sense and cod­
neuroscience. Such a view takes the existence of sense-data to be a 
substantive matter, and would take seriously the idea of the priority 
of mind over its objects (sense-data being dependent for their exist­
ence on our awareness of them). The particular form of phenome­
nalism that Ayer favoured at various times, both in The Foundations 
12. (Price ) p.. 
13. Cf. here Paul’s famous discussion of the nature of sense-data and our inability to decide 
certain key issues about their identity and persistence, (Paul ). The force of his questions 
holds as long as we think of sense-data as objects open to investigation independent of our acts 
of awareness of them, such that questions about sense-data should be settled by looking to the 
data themselves, rather than thinking of sense-data as no more than the shadows of the expe­
riences that can be brought about by suitably aﬀecting the mind. 
14. See(Broad ), (Broad ), and (Broad ). 
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of Empirical Knowledge and later, would rule out taking this thought 
seriously.  It is no surprise then that both Ayer and Austin should 
agree that the way for Ayer to mark out what sense-data are is via the 
criterion of incorrigibility.  For it is only if Ayer adopts this criterion 
that he then has a way of distinguishing sense-data from material 
objects which could be employed from ‘ﬁrst principles’.  Using this 
means, he doesn’t need to appeal either to the general causal condi­
tions of perception or to claims about the relative dependence or in­
dependence of the objects of sense. 
So Austin’s charge that his opponents had no good way of deﬁn­
ing ‘sense-datum’ holds good in respect to the way that Price (and in 
fact Moore and Broad) conceived of the issue. His diagnosis, that 
the underlying conception of the distinction relates to an epistemo­
logical concern with incorrigibility, is a correct characterisation of 
Ayer’s own position when Ayer seeks to redeﬁne the debate.  But 
while the diagnosis is accurate in respect of Ayer, it is not clear that it 
holds true of Price. Austin downplays the sense in which both he 
and Ayer wish to reject the appearance of a problem of some sub­
stance that the argument from illusion supposedly poses for us. 
Again, I want to stress that these results arise from the particular 
set of assumptions present in Price’s work and again those present in 
Ayer.  Price, like Moore before him, thought that it was absurd to 
suppose that the objects of awareness might be mind-dependent. 
Like Broad, who thought this at least an open matter, Price was non­
committal about the completeness of physics, and was interested in 
the possibility of para-psychological phenomena. So the very possi­
bility that there might be interesting relations of dependence be­
tween the physical world and certain non-physical entities was not 
to be ruled out as apparently absurd. Ayer, like Price, wished to ﬁnd 
grounds for developing an account of perception and perceptual 
knowledge that could proceed from ﬁrst principles, and albeit for 
diﬀerent reasons, was not keen to stress either the mind-dependence 
or mind-independence of any particular entity. 
We might then wonder whether in choosing these two authors to 
comment on, Austin really has found the best expositions of a tradi­
tional doctrine about the objects of sense. For it really is not clear 
that the particular concerns which drive Price and Ayer are echoed 
even in the debate among early modern philosophers, let alone in 
the discussion of these issues which traces back to Heraclitus. Now 
the worry here extends to the second line of criticism mentioned 
above, Austin’s dismissal of the argument from illusion. 
In the third chapter Austin sets about the ‘so-called “argument 
from illusion”’, spending some time pointing out how rare genuine 
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illusions are, and how we often can detect when we are suﬀering an 
illusion or hallucination. He also suggests that one root of the use of 
the argument involves a confusion of illusion with delusion. This 
suggestion is highly unlikely to convince anyone who has felt the 
pull of the argument. In particular, if we think back to the sugges­
tion earlier about how one might attempt to deﬁne a general notion 
of sense-datum, then one might think that the relative frequency of 
perfect hallucinations is not really to the point. Rather, the basic 
thought is just that for any given perception, or course of percep­
tions that one has, one could have a sequence of hallucinations 
which one could not tell from the inside were not those perceptions. 
Regardless of the frequency of such states of mind, the pressing 
question is what the consequences of this possibility might amount 
to. 
Austin’s discussion develops further in later chapters and his re­
sponse to the above complaint comes late in the ﬁfth chapter when 
he insists: 
But if we are prepared to admit that there may be, even that there are, 
some cases in which ‘delusive and veridical perceptions’ really are in­
distinguishable, does this admission require us to drag in, or even let 
in sense-data?  No.  For even if we were to make the prior admission 
(which we have so far found no reason to make) that in the ‘abnor­
mal’ cases we perceive sense-data, we should not be obliged to ex­
tend this admission to the ‘normal’ cases too. For why on earth 
should it not be the case that, in some few instances, perceiving one 
sort of thing is exactly like perceiving another?15 
Now what Austin has to say here has much force against Price’s pic­
ture of sense-data. If we are not prepared to introduce (non-physi­
cal) sense-data as essentially mind-dependent rather than merely 
non-physical, and must instead introduce the notion of a sense-da­
tum in a way which leaves open the status of the objects of percep­
tion, then how can one rule out the possibility of the observable 
properties of a physical object and of a sense-datum coinciding? 
After all, it is not inconceivable that someone should so con­
struct a decoy duck that by sight alone one could not tell it from the 
real duck that lives in the village pond. The mere fact that these two 
items could not be told apart would not in itself show that one could 
only ever see the decoy duck, or that neither the decoy nor the real 
duck could ever be seen. Rather, what it shows is that, if one relies 
solely on one’s powers of sight, one is not a position to tell apart the 
two entities. Likewise, the metaphysical status of an entity—wheth­
15. Op. cit. p.. 
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er it is physical or not, or whether it is mind-dependent or not— 
may not be something which is directly observable about it. In­
stead, what one has to go on is its observed shape or colour, and in 
this a decoy duck and a mere sense-datum as of a duck might coin­
cide. This fact alone would not show that on the one occasion one 
was presented with a decoy duck, while on another one had to hand 
merely the simulacrum of such a material thing, the mere sense-da­
tum. 
Austin’s point here has force because it focuses on the objects of 
awareness and asks the perfectly reasonable question why two dis­
tinct objects of awareness should not be indistinguishable. But this 
is not the only way to understand the problem. If one adopts the al­
ternative conception of sense-data as mind-dependent in the way 
sketched earlier, then one will conceive of the kind of experience 
which one has when hallucinating as thereby having an object of 
awareness independent of how things are in the subject’s environ­
ment. Bringing about such a state of mind will be suﬃcient for it to 
have an object, its sense-datum. With this conception of experience, 
a diﬀerent argument from subjective indistinguishability can be 
mounted. For, one might claim, if two conscious states of mind 
could not be distinguished by their subject ‘from the inside’, then 
that gives us conclusive grounds for supposing that the two states of 
mind are of the same kind. Note that someone committed to this 
claim need not suppose that there could not be radically distinct but 
indistinguishable objects of perception—in such cases there is no 
reason to deny that one is in the same type of state of mind, namely 
a relation to some object or other with certain perceptible proper­
ties. The point here is not whether distinct particulars may share 
the same properties, but rather whether distinct types of state of 
mind could be indistinguishable by the subject whose states they 
are. One reason for endorsing the indistinguishability condition in 
the restricted domain of conscious states of mind would be the 
thought that there is a tight connection here with the kind of au­
thoritative self-conscious knowledge that we have of our own con­
scious states of mind. 
Now, if the hallucinatory experience is of the same kind as the 
experience had when seeing the decoy duck, then truths about the 
intrinsic nature of that kind of experience will hold of perceptions 
equally as they hold of hallucinations. If in the case of the hallucina­
tion it is true that the experience is of a kind suﬃcient to bring 
about its object independent of how the subject’s physical environ­
ment is, then the same will be true of the experience in the case of 
perception.  So, we have reason in this case too, to suppose that 
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there is a non-physical object of awareness, a sense-datum distinct 
from the decoy duck, before the subject. Pace Austin, then, one may 
well have reason to suppose that, if one accepts that there are sense­
data as the objects of awareness in cases of hallucination, one has 
reason to believe that there is an inner object of awareness even in 
cases of veridical perception. 
Again, I don’t want to suggest that this argument is conclusive. 
Indeed, I think that we have good reason to reject the reasoning.16 
The point is rather that Austin does not even articulate this argu­
ment, let alone frame any response to it. In his study of Austin, 
Warnock comments on his lack of interest in arguments which trade 
on the fact that there is a causal transaction between object of per­
ception and perceiver. Warnock suggests that there is no ground for 
criticism here, since the mere fact that Austin didn’t discuss all pos­
sible grounds for the views he opposes, does not show that the at­
tack which he does launch is not eﬀective. While this is correct as 
far as it goes, it underplays one of the pretensions stated at the outset 
of Sense & Sensibilia, that Austin is picking on Ayer and Price be­
cause they oﬀer the best exposition of an ancient and persistent line 
of argument.  The ways in which he diagnoses both the argument 
from illusion and the dichotomy of sense-datum/material thing 
turn on particular aspects of the two philosophers he discusses most 
fully.  It is not at all clear that the predilections that they possess 
echo down the centuries to earlier debates about appearance and re­
ality, or to the debate that now occurs about the nature of percep­
tion. 
Austin oﬀers us a particular portrait of the shape of a problem 
that he wishes now to consign to history.  As with so many philo­
sophical portraits of the past, when later we come to assess the inter­
pretation we ﬁnd ourselves as much like the position of a viewer of 
one of Van Meegeren’s Vermeers. In the s, such pictures may 
well have seemed clearly to be authentic depictions of life in the six­
teenth century, while today it is clear to us that the women depicted 
belong in our own century.  So while to Austin and his contempo­
raries his portrait of past concerns about the problems of perception 
might have seemed an acute expression of the underlying motiva­
tions, for us looking back now it is easier to see the shapes of their 
own concerns, in the mid-twentieth century, than the deeper under­
currents which moved much earlier thinkers. 
In questioning the critical elements of Austin’s discussion, I 
mean only to clear out of the way the most common aspects of in­
16. See (Martin ) for a more detailed discussion of the argument, and responses to it. 
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terpretation of these lectures in order better to focus on the more 
positive elements within Austin’s outlook which still has a bearing 
on some current concerns. The underlying problem of illusion 
which we have just outlined will turn out after all to have a further 
role to play. 
3.One of the themes of Sense & Sensibilia is what we might call a 
commitment to a common sense realism, and this lurks behind 
many of the criticisms of Ayer.  To give it a label such as ‘common 
sense realism’ may suggest that some particular doctrine, or thesis 
about the nature of the world, or our relation to it is being attribut­
ed to Austin, but there is something unhappy in this context of char­
acterising it in quite that way.  One might rather speak of it as a 
certain attitude or commitment on Austin’s part, but then that too 
may just obfuscate matters.  At one level, the thought is just that 
Austin’s view is that we should just accept as facts those things which 
ordinarily we do see for what they are, facts. We shouldn’t question 
such things as that Balliol is West of New College; or that cups don’t 
normally fall through tables; or that I can normally tell whether 
there is a pig in the room just by looking.  One should look askance 
at any philosophical doctrine which questions these evident truths, 
or any approach which attempts to reconstrue them in unfamiliar 
ways or make the obvious unheimlich. 
Perhaps another way of getting at this theme is by linking it with 
ﬁgures from Austin’s past.  One link here is with Moore, whom Aus­
tin is reported to have admired.17 Moore’s paper, ‘Certainty’ begins: 
I am at present, as you can all see, in a room and not in the open air; 
I am standing up, and not either sitting or lying down; I have clothes 
on, and am not absolutely naked; I am speaking in a fairly loud voice, 
and am not either singing or whispering or keeping quite silent; I 
have in my hand some sheets of paper with writing on them; there 
are a good many other people in the same room in which I am; and 
there are windows in that wall and a door in this one.18 
Moore uses such examples of particular pieces of knowledge of the 
world to question sceptical arguments, that he is not certain of these 
things, or that he does not know he is not dreaming. I do not wish 
to suggest that Austin follows Moore in appealing to such obvious 
facts as the basis for an argument against scepticism. It is not clear 
that Austin is concerned to argue against sceptics, rather than show 
the incoherence of certain assumptions held in common by sceptics 
17. (Grice ), p.; Grice is somewhat baﬄed by Austin’s admiration here. 
18. (Moore ), p.. 
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and their opponents.  Nevertheless, in Austin as in Moore there is 
close attention to what clearly are fairly day to day facts of life. 
One can also trace a connection with certain of Austin’s prede­
cessors in Oxford. Somewhat frivolously I am inclined to reproduce 
an anecdote of Farquharson’s about Cook Wilson: 
About ten men were present at the ﬁrst informal class of that year. 
He was treating by request the Kantian paradox: ‘the mind makes 
nature, the material it does not make’.  He paused in his familiar 
manner and bending forward looked ﬁxedly in the face of a Balliol 
man in a ragged scholar’s gown. He, supposing himself to be inter­
rogated or in a spirit of mischief, blurted out: ‘But why shouldn’t the 
table be there, just where we see it?’  Silence attended the result. The 
professor  sprang once in  the  air;  said very ﬁercely indeed: ‘Why 
shouldn’t it?’ and then relapsed into reverie. The scholar never re­
turned, but I have sometimes wondered whether the shock set Wil­
son determinedly to work clearing the path which after many days 
led him far from the idealist solution he then accepted or appeared 
19to accept. 
Introducing the scholar’s reaction and Cook Wilson’s accession to it 
are not entirely without serious point. For together with his new 
found commitment to a form of realism, Cook Wilson insisted on 
the contrast between knowledge and belief as distinct kinds of men­
tal act, a view also taken up by his student Prichard. Prichard in­
sists: 
Knowing is absolutely diﬀerent from what is called indiﬀerently be­
lieving or being convinced or being persuaded or having an opinion 
or thinking, in the sense in which we oppose thinking to knowing, as 
when we say ‘I think so but am not sure’.  Knowing is not something 
which diﬀers from being convinced by a diﬀerence of degree of 
something such as a feeling of conﬁdence…Knowing and believing 
diﬀer in kind as do desiring and feeling, or as do a red colour and a 
blue colour.20 
And one can ﬁnd in ‘Other Minds’, echoes of these sentiments when 
Austin claims: 
There is a singular diﬀerence between the two forms of challenge: 
‘How do you know?’ and ‘Why do you believe?’ We seem never to ask 
‘Why do you know?’ or ‘How do you believe?’ And in this, as well as 
in other respects to be noticed later, not merely such words as ‘sup­
pose’ ‘assume’, etc.. but also the expressions ‘be sure’ and ‘be certain’, 
follow the example of ‘believe’, not that of ‘know’.21 
19. Farquharson’s ‘Memoir’, in (Wilson ), p.xix. 
20. (Prichard b), p.. 
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This precedes Austin’s notorious suggestion that ‘I know’ does not 
describe one’s situation, but is rather a performative to be compared 
to ‘I promise’. While Austin seems to have taken up certain ideas 
from his predecessors, there is also a distinctively diﬀerent spin on 
the way the doctrine is to be interpreted.  The contrast is not repeat­
ed in Sense & Sensibilia, and there is no hint of the controversial 
claim about avowals of knowledge, but there is a related point of 
some signiﬁcance in Austin’s discussion of incorrigibility, for there 
he insists in certain favourable circumstances, I can know some­
thing without the possibility of mistake, and in such cases I do not 
have evidence for what I know, rather I can just see that it is so 
(pp.-). 
The emphasis on resting on what are obvious matters of fact is 
evident throughout Sense & Sensibilia. We ﬁnd Austin paying atten­
tion to what is simply a matter of fact, something that we all know, 
and which should lead us to question closely any philosophical the­
sis which entices us away from this. At the beginning of Chapter III, 
Austin adds a footnote to Ayer’s discussion of the argument from il­
lusion: 
It is not only strange, but also important, that Ayer calls these ‘as­
sumptions’. Later on he is going to take seriously the notion of de­
nying at least one of them, which he could hardly do if he had 
recognized them here as the plain and incontestable facts that they 
are.22 
Further, when Austin diagnoses Ayer’s evaluation of the argument 
from illusion in Chapter VI, the complaint is really that Ayer’s sug­
gestions about how we could talk about illusion either rely on a de­
gree of ‘insouciant latitude’ that one can just say what one likes, or 
really presuppose the truth of his position, that the facts that there 
are to talk about, are facts about sense-data. Given that these are not 
the facts, that the facts are such as that there are straight sticks and 
that such sticks remain straight when placed in water however they 
may then come to look, then we are not only in the position to reject 
Ayer’s account, but also to complain that really we don’t know what 
is being said. Ayer’s terms, and his instructions would make sense if 
we could use the terms appropriately in response to how things are. 
And, of course, things are just not the way that Ayer claims them to 
be. 
But the commitment to a common sense realism, and a concern 
with what knowledge must be, come to a head in Chapter X.  This 
21. (Austin a), p.. 
22. (Austin ), p. ft.. 
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contains the heart of the dispute between Austin and Ayer, where 
Austin ﬁxes his eye on various doctrines concerning incorribility 
and knowledge. At the end of Chapter IX, Austin claims about 
sense-datum theorists that: 
Their real motive—and this lies right at the heart of the whole mat­
ter—is that they wish to produce a species of statement that will be 
incorrigible; and the real virtue of the invented sense of ‘perceive’ is 
that, since what is perceived in this sense has to exist and has to be as 
it appears, in saying what I perceive in this sense I can’t be wrong.23 
Now, as we have seen, this claim ﬁts Ayer’s position well, and Ayer is 
happy to endorse this description of the debate. In moving the de­
bate about perception away from the kind of substantive and quasi­
empirical issues raised by Price and others, Ayer is keen to locate the 
matter in a debate about the foundations of empirical knowledge. 
For that very reason, Austin’s diagnosis as applied either to Price or 
to the earlier tradition may look more suspect. For all that, Austin’s 
discussion of incorribility and Ayer’s exasperation with it bring out 
most clearly the stand-oﬀ between what I’m calling Austin’s com­
mon sense realism and Ayer’s own approach. It is here that we can 
get the keenest sense of the positive themes in Austin’s work. 
It may appear odd to claim that there is a positive thesis or com­
mitment in the discussion of incorrigibility, since most discussions 
of it have tended to emphasise its negative aspects, the claim that: 
There isn’t, there couldn’t be, any kind of sentence which as such is 
incapable, once uttered, of being subsequently amended or retract­
ed.24 
The focus of discussion since has been on whether Austin has dem­
onstrated that statements about our own sensations are not incorri­
gible in this sense, and in part then whether one can delimit suitably 
the range or ‘merely verbal’ slips which can enter into the making of 
such a judgement. And if we focus solely on this question, few, I 
think, would take what Austin says to have been decisive, although it 
is equally the case that few people now would place much weight on 
the incorrigibility of ﬁrst person reports of sensation.25 
But what is of equal importance is what Austin goes on to say fol­
lowing his critique of incorrigible sensation reports, namely what he 
does want to take to stand as unquestionable knowledge: 
23. (Austin ), p.. 
24. p. . 
25. For discussions of Austin v. Ayer on this, cf. (Forguson ), (Ayer b), (Pears ); for 
more recent discussions of incorrigibility and sensation cf. (Churchland ), Ch. and espe­
cially, (Williamson ). 
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…it may be said, even if such cautious formulae are not intrinsically 
incorrigible, surely there will be plenty of cases in which what we say 
by their utterance will in fact be incorrigible…Well, yes, no doubt 
this is true. But then exactly the same thing is true of utterances in 
which quite diﬀerent forms of word are employed… if I watch for 
some time an animal a few feet in front of me, in a good light, if I 
prod it perhaps, and sniﬀ, and take note of the noises it makes, I may 
say, ‘That’s a pig’; and this too will be ‘incorrigible’, nothing could be 
produced that would show that I had made a mistake.26 
According to Austin, in as much as it is right for us to speak of the 
certainty of any claims we make, then we should just accept the 
plain truth that we are certain of many judgements made about 
things such as pigs, given certain propitious circumstances of mak­
ing the judgement. 
Ayer, of course, will have nothing of this. He complains: 
The fact on which Austin is relying is that one would not ordinarily 
say that the existence of the chair was uncertain unless one had some 
special reason for supposing it to be so… 
This is true, so far as it goes. But if we consider the reasons which 
have led sense-datum theorists to speak of uncertainty in this con­
nexion, we shall ﬁnd that they remain untouched. The most that is 
proved against them is that they have chosen a misleading way of ex­
pressing the point that they were trying to make. As I see it, this 
point is a purely logical one.  It is that in any such situation as de­
scribed by Austin the occurrence of the experience which gives rise 
to the perceptual judgement is logically consistent with the judge­
ment’s being false…So, when the sense-datum theorist says, no 
doubt misleadingly, that even in the most favourable conditions of 
perception it remains uncertain whether the chair exists, what he 
must be understood to mean is that the statement that the chair ex­
ists does not follow logically from any statement, or indeed from any 
ﬁnite number of statements, which are limited to describing the con­
tent of the observer’s experience.27 
This gets right to the heart of the dispute between them, but even 
here Ayer manages to misstate Austin’s actual position. Austin is not 
merely claiming that we do not say that we are uncertain in propi­
tious situations, he is claiming that, as a matter of fact, we are cer­
tain and not open to revision. Ayer, of course, thinks such a 
position absurd, and he does so for the reasons he cites towards the 
end of this passage. These concerns link directly to the conception 
26. Pp. -. 
27. (Ayer a), pp.-. 
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of sense-data and the argument from illusion discussed earlier, and 
which we noted Austin did not take proper heed of. 
For any case in which one sees a pig head-on, it is possible that 
one should rather be suﬀering a matching hallucination brought 
about, perhaps, by skilled manipulation of areas of one’s visual cor­
tex.  There are two diﬀerent things that Ayer would seek to extract 
from such a case. First, the statement that one makes in the case of 
veridical perception is true, but the very same statement as made 
when one has the matching hallucination is false.  If the two situa­
tions are relevantly the same (i.e. from the point of view of assessing 
whether the subject is justiﬁed or knows), then the possibility of a 
mistake in the second situation shows that one cannot be certain in 
the ﬁrst. Secondly, if one reﬂects on what other judgements one 
might be able to make, one could see that in entertaining the doubt 
that one was perceiving and not hallucinating, one would still be in 
a position to make a judgement about one’s experience. Of course, 
for Ayer, such judgements are to be classiﬁed as sense-datum judge­
ments, but the key claim here is independent of any commitment to 
sense-data and sense-datum language—almost all philosophers now 
who repudiate the idea of sense-datum judgements are still happy to 
admit that there is a relevant judgement here to be made about one’s 
experience; one might simply report that it is with one as if a pig is 
there. This statement would be true not only in the ﬁrst situation, 
but also in the second, so there would be no grounds to deny that 
one is certain of it, that one knows it. Furthermore, Ayer suggests, 
we can see the contrast between the certainty of these judgements as 
implying a kind of inference or transition from the more certain 
facts to be judged about to the less certain. 
Austin would certainly think that this kind of reasoning is just 
confused. He asserts: 
It seems to be generally realized nowadays that, if you take a bunch 
of sentences (or propositions, to use the term Ayer prefers) impecca­
bly formulated in some language or other, there can be no question 
of sorting them out into those that are true and those that are false; 
for (leaving out of account the so-called ‘analytic’ sentences) the 
question of truth and falsehood does not turn only on what a sen­
tence is, nor yet on what it means, but on, speaking very broadly, the 
circumstances in which it is uttered. Sentences are not as such either 
true or false.  But it is really equally clear, when one comes to think 
of it, that for much the same reasons there could be no question of 
picking out from one’s bunch of sentences those that are evidence for 
others, those that are ‘testable’, or those that are ‘incorrigible’. What 
kind of sentence is uttered as providing evidence for what depends, 
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again, on the circumstance of the particular cases; there is no kind of 
sentence which as such is evidence-providing, just as there is no kind 
of sentence which as such is surprising, or doubtful, or certain, or in­
corrigible, or true.28 
On the occasion on which one does just see the pig one can know 
that the pig is there, and express knowledge with one’s use of the 
sentence, ‘That’s a pig’.  This fact about one is not undermined, ac­
cording to Austin, by the thought that there are other circumstanc­
es, and other occasions, on which one could use the very same 
sentence to say something which was not true, or which did not ex­
press knowledge. The mere fact that there are possible situations in 
which one would go wrong does not show that in the actual situa­
tion, where one has not gone wrong, and that is not a matter of 
some mere ﬂuke, one does know that the pig is there. 
Equally important for the critique is a resistance to the idea that 
one’s perceptual judgement is the result of some actual or potential 
inference, that one’s judgement, whether certain or uncertain, re­
sults from some sensitivity to evidence available to one.  Austin is 
insistent: 
The situation in which I would properly be said to have evidence for 
the statement that some animal is a pig is that, for example, in which 
the beast itself is not actually on view, but I can see plenty of pig-like 
marks on the ground outside its retreat. If I ﬁnd a few buckets of pig­
food, that’s a bit more evidence, and the noises and the smell may 
provide better evidence still.  But if the animal then emerges and 
stands there plainly in view, there is no longer any question of col­
lecting evidence; its coming into view doesn’t provide me with more 
evidence that it’s a pig, I can now just see that it is, the question is set­
tled.29 
Now Ayer’s reaction to this is again just to treat it as a matter of 
pointing out a commonly agreed truth: that we don’t normally 
make a conscious inference in perceptual judgement. This, he 
holds, is irrelevant, since the key point is the ‘logical’ one that we 
have introduced above, and that is enough to show that the percep­
tual judgement has, as its grounds, evidence which makes it less 
than certain.30  But, again, this doesn’t directly engage with Austin. 
First, the issue is not one of logic at all. Grant that ‘It appears to S as 
if there is a table before S’ does not entail ‘There is a table before S’ 
but does entail ‘It appears to S as if there is a table before her’, this 
28. p.. 
29. p.. 
30. (Ayer a), pp.-. 
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still tells us nothing as it stands about grounds, reason or justiﬁca­
tion. The issue here is one about the relations among a subject’s 
states of mind, her perceivings and knowings or comings to know, 
not simply about the logical relations among propositions.31 
Secondly, Ayer just doesn’t take seriously the conception that 
Austin has of the matter.  As noted earlier, we have here an echo of 
the claims in ‘Other Minds’ that there is a contrast between believ­
ing and knowing.  In the case of belief one may have reasons for 
one’s belief, one can ask ‘Why?’ In the case of knowledge one can 
merely indicate the means or methods by which one comes to know, 
one can ask ‘How?’ 
One can ask in the case of a mistaken judgement, where the sub­
ject falsely believes that there is a pig in front of her, ‘Why does she 
believe that?’ An adequate answer may well mention the fact that it 
looked to her as if there was a pig there. But if the subject simply 
knows that a pig is there in the propitious circumstances of pig­
presence being manifest to her, then, Austin implies, one cannot ask 
with respect to her knowing that the pig is there why she knows it, 
and hence cannot answer such a question by citing as a ground the 
fact that it looks to her as if a pig is there—the kind of fact that Ayer 
takes to be the kind of grounds for any perceptual judgement as a 
matter of logic.  So we are to hold on to the idea, present in Cook 
Wilson and Prichard, that in the right circumstances one just knows 
right oﬀ how things are. 
Yet while Ayer’s criticisms don’t directly engage with Austin’s po­
sition here, one might still think that there is a challenge here for 
Austin to answer.  For, even if one does not think that the issues here 
are just ones of logic, one might still want to know whether the vari­
ous possibilities of illusion and hallucination bear on the ways in 
which simply perceiving something can underpin knowledge of the 
world or claims to such knowledge.  And as Ayer notes, Austin does 
not give any general account of veriﬁcation, or any direct argument 
for why the views he opposes must be wrong.  And that is because 
Austin doubts that any general theory of these issues can be given at 
all: 
…it would be a mistake in principle to suppose that the same thing 
could be done for knowledge in general. And this is because there could 
be no general answer to the questions what is evidence for what, what 
is certain, what is doubtful, what needs or does not need evidence, 
31. This, at least, is one of the morals to be drawn from Austin’s discussion, that the theory of 
knowledge or justiﬁcation is not simply a theory about evidential relations among proposi­
tions or sentences.  It is a moral which has not been properly appreciated in some recent dis­
cussions of epistemology. 
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can or can’t be veriﬁed. If the Theory of Knowledge consists in ﬁnd­
ing grounds for such an answer, there is no such thing.32 
For him it simply doesn’t follow that because on some occasions one 
would go wrong in judging that there is a pig there, that even in the 
most propitious circumstances the same must be true too.  This is 
all that there is to say.  He defends our certain knowledge of various 
banal and simple facts by denying that we can even frame a general 
theory of knowledge which might set out to question and then pos­
sibly vindicate our common claims to knowledge. 
One might feel rather disappointed at this stand-oﬀ. It seems to 
suggest that the only way in which one could do justice to the kind 
of common sense realism expressed in Sense & Sensibilia is just by 
rejecting wholesale the philosophical project of giving a theory of 
knowledge or justiﬁcation.33  If that were so, then it would leave the 
kind of realism in question looking like a very fragile philosophical 
hope. 
It  is  at  just  this  point  that  we  can  look  for  connections  with 
Putnam’s ‘natural realism’ and the ‘disjunctive’ theories of percep­
tion and knowledge that Putnam draws upon. For we can ask both 
the extent to which these theories are nascent in Austin himself, and 
the extent to which he may be able to call upon them as an alterna­
tive to just turning his back on the questions that Ayer would like to 
press. 
4.  The lessons that Putnam thinks philosophers have failed to learn 
concern the status of perceptual experiences as ‘intermediaries’ be­
tween us and the world: 
…I agree with James, as well as with McDowell, that the false belief 
that perception must be so analyzed is the root of all the problems 
with the view of perception that, in one form or another, has domi­
nated Western philosophy since the seventeenth century. James’s 
idea is that the traditional claim that we must conceive of our senso­
ry experiences as intermediaries between us and the world has no 
sound arguments to support it, and, worse, makes it impossible to 
see how persons can be in genuine contact with a world at all.34 
McDowell’s earliest statement of this sort of view can be found in 
‘Criteria, Defeasibility and Knowledge’ when he claims: 
…an appearance that such-and-such is the case can be either a mere 
appearance or the fact made manifest to someone... the object of ex­
32. p.. 
33. For a development of Austin’s criticisms of epistemology here, see (Williams ). 
34. (Putnam ), p.. 
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perience in the deceptive cases is a mere appearance. But we are not 
to accept that in the non-deceptive cases too the object of experience 
is a mere appearance, and hence something that falls short of the fact 
itself… appearances are no longer conceived as intervening between 
the experiencing subject and the world.35 
McDowell’s form of disjunctivism is not the only, nor the ﬁrst, such 
form of view associated with perception. Michael Hinton presented 
such a view ﬁrst in some papers in the late s,  followed by his 
monograph Experiences.36 His intention there was to contrast as 
disjuncts the perceivings of objects and hallucinations, where it is 
for one as if some object looks a certain way to one; in developing 
this line, Hinton sought to plug a gap in the rejection of the argu­
ment from illusion that he found in Austin’s comments.  McDow­
ell’s form of the view does not contrast veridical perception of 
objects with hallucinations of objects, but the perception of facts, 
that things are thus and so, with mere appearances. In this way, Mc-
Dowell’s form of disjunctivism seems closer to Cook Wilson’s and 
Prichard’s views of knowledge and belief. This is one reason for 
ﬁnding a connection with Austin. So it seems appropriate to ask to 
what extent is McDowell’s disjunctivism a development of the posi­
tion in Austin, i.e. to what extent is common sense realism, as I la­
belled it, simply ‘natural realism’? 
There are a couple of reasons already to make us doubt that there 
can be any straightforward identiﬁcation here. Although, as we’ve 
seen, there are some echoes of Cook Wilson and Prichard in Austin, 
the way in which they are developed is very diﬀerent from those au­
thors and also from McDowell. For McDowell it is important to say 
that the state I am in when I see the pig in front of me is a case of the 
fact of the pig’s presence being manifest to me and this is not to be 
identiﬁed with any case of mere appearance which would be present 
were I merely hallucinating or suﬀering some illusion. Austin’s way, 
when explicitly developing the contrast, is to indicate the different 
uses of the term ‘know’ and ‘believe’.  Moreover, and perhaps more 
substantially, Austin’s criticisms of talk of evidence for what one be­
lieves or knows seems to require a much greater pessimism about 
what we can usefully say about knowledge and justiﬁcation in gen­
eral than anything in McDowell’s picture. 
We might then, instead, think of such disjunctivism as an at­
tempt to develop Austinian insights into our situation without hav­
35. (McDowell ) p. (in Dancy reprint, ). 
36. (Hinton ); Hinton’s disjunctivism is discussed and reﬁned further in (Snow­
don -). 
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ing to embrace quite the destructive attitude towards theory of 
knowledge in general that he seems to have. One could then explain 
why Austin would be right to assert that in the case of being present­
ed with the pig one just knows straight oﬀ that the pig is there, re­
gardless of the remote possibility of hallucination, by pointing out 
that in this situation one is in the position of pig-presence being 
manifest, and that is a salient diﬀerence from the case of mere hallu­
cination. 
But is this kind of disjunctivism about perception the only way 
that Austin’s position could be further developed against the chal­
lenge from Ayer? What is central to Austin’s concerns are that one 
should be able to insist that one does just know that there is a pig 
there in propitious circumstances, regardless of what is to be said 
about cases of hallucination. What this requires, in particular, is 
that one should resist any attempt to generalise back claims made 
about the unfortunate cases of illusion or hallucination where one’s 
judgement is mistaken to the propitious cases where one perceives 
things as they are. But disjunctivism about perception and knowl­
edge is only one way of blocking this kind of move. 
Many philosophers now would be prepared to accept that there 
is no kind of inference involved in moving from experience to per­
ceptual judgement, that there is no inference from a proposition 
about the appearances of pigs to a judgement about the presence of 
a pig.37  Nevertheless, they would be prepared to admit that the 
same state of mind, the same experience, is present in the case of 
veridical perception and in the case of hallucination.38  Turning to 
knowledge rather than perception, it is even more common to ﬁnd 
philosophers who claim that the fact that a given method of ﬁxing 
belief, such as use of the senses, may give rise to false belief in some 
possible circumstances, is not enough to show that the processes 
cannot give rise to knowledge in more propitious circumstances. 
For, in the case of normal perception, it will be no accident that the 
subject manages to grasp the truth about the presence of pigs by use 
of her senses.39 
Now Putnam suggests that the mere fact that one allows that the 
same mental states may be present in both circumstances will show 
that the states in question act as ‘intermediaries’ and deny us ‘genu­
37. Cf. (Harman ), (Burge a), p. ft. . 
38. (Burge b)  develops  Burge’s  view  here  in  comparison  with  John Searle’s  account in, 
(Searle ), who would also be a candidate for the kind of view discussed here in the text. 
39. This is, of course, a theme of much of the ‘externalist’ literature on knowledge and justiﬁ­
cation. Representative discussions are, (Dretske ), (Goldman ), (Nozick ), Ch.; 
see also (Foster ), Ch. and (Peacocke ), Ch.. 
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ine cognitive contact’ with the world. This would seem to be at one 
with some of McDowell’s complaints against views which do not 
build truth into the very state of mind central to knowledge, ‘hybrid 
conceptions’ of knowledge as he has come to christen them: 
In the hybrid conception, a satisfactory standing in the space of rea­
sons is only part of what knowledge is; truth is an extra requirement. 
So two subjects can be alike in respect of the satisfactoriness of their 
standing in the space of reasons, although only one of them is a 
knower, because only in her case is what she takes to be so actually 
so…how can the unconnected obtaining of the fact have any intelli­
gible bearing on an epistemic position that the person’s standing in 
the space of reasons is supposed to help constitute?40 
But the opposition may not be convinced.  Of course, McDowell 
and Putnam wish to describe the subject as conceived by the ‘hy­
brid’ conception as cut-oﬀ from the facts even in the most propi­
tious circumstances.  But what is to stop the opponent from just 
insisting that just what it is to have cognitive contact with the world 
is to be in this state of mind in such circumstances? Nothing more 
could be required. It would simply be illegitimate to generalise back 
from the case of mistaken judgement or lack of knowledge to the 
central cases where circumstances go our way.  So the mere fact that 
one would be cut-oﬀ in unfortunate circumstances would not show 
that one must be cut-oﬀ in propitious circumstances, even if there is 
a relevant state of mind present in both situations.  Or so they would 
claim. 
The stand-oﬀ here between McDowell and these alternative con­
ceptions of knowledge indicates another diﬀerence of approach be­
tween this form of disjunctivism and Austin’s attitudes to 
perception and knowledge. Although it is no part of McDowell’s 
project to present a direct argument against scepticism with respect 
to the external world, a concern with such scepticism does form part 
of the armoury he employs against his opponents. On occasion, to 
highlight what he takes to be the inadequacies of such views, he ar­
gues that such scepticism is a consequence of accepting the oppo­
nent’s position. This suggests a diﬀerence of tone from Austin.  For 
Austin really does not take seriously sceptical reasoning, which he 
treats with suspicion as rather ramshackle. So it is not clear that he 
would accept that scepticism followed inexorably from any one par­
ticular conception of perception or knowledge. 
So, it is doubtful, I suggest, whether Putnam is right to see Austin 
as a straightforward precursor of either McDowell’s or his own 
40. (McDowell ), p.. 
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views of perception and cognition. It is just not obvious that the 
best development of Austin’s views of the commonplace should be 
given in terms of McDowell’s and Putnam’s disjunctivism. 
But perhaps we can tease out slightly more from the notion of 
common sense realism, to ﬁnd a closer echo of concern and content 
between Austin and Putnam. And that leaves me with one last con­
nection to draw between the common sense realism that Austin es­
pouses and recent forms of disjunctivism.  One has a reason to 
endorse some form of disjunctivism where one supposes that there 
is some positive connection or contact with the world in the propi­
tious cases of perceiving that things are so, or correctly recognising 
them to be that way, and one supposes that such a property could 
not be present were the relevant state of mind common between 
cases of perception and hallucination. So one might think that a 
common sense realism would lead to McDowell’s disjunctivism to 
the extent that its proper articulation here requires us to embrace a 
conception of cognitive contact with the world which would rule 
out any such common element to perception and hallucination, or 
knowledge and false opinion. 
The  most  suggestive way  of  doing  so  in  relation  to  perception, 
would seem to take us far from Austin’s oﬃcial stance, though. For 
developing this line of thought requires us to take far more seriously 
the argument from illusion than Austin does.  On Austin’s account 
of the problems of perception, a philosopher like Price no less than 
Ayer is driven by epistemological concerns, and he cites the notori­
ous passage concerning doubt and tomatoes in support of this. But 
that really is to misread Price’s view.  That is perhaps best brought 
out by considering more carefully the passage itself: 
When I see a tomato there is much that I can doubt. I can doubt 
whether it is a tomato that I am seeing, and not a cleverly painted 
piece of wax. I can doubt whether there is a material thing there at 
all… One thing however I cannot doubt: that there exists a red patch 
of a round and somewhat bulgy shape, standing out from a back­
ground of other colour-patches, and having a certain visual depth, 
and that this whole ﬁeld of colour is presented to my conscious­
ness…that something is red and round then and there I cannot 
doubt…that it now exists, and that I am conscious of it—by me at 
least who am conscious of it this cannot possibly be doubted… This 
peculiar and ultimate manner of being present to consciousness is 
called being given, and that which is thus present is called a datum.41 
One could just about read this passage as a search for certainty, end­
41. (Price ), p.. 
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ing in the positing of some item a sense-datum which meets that 
pathological demand. But there is a much more appropriate read­
ing of it than that, which takes us away from any simple epistemo­
logical concern. Later in the book, Price confesses: 
When I say ‘This table appears brown to me’ it is quite plain that I 
am acquainted with an actual instance of brownness (or equally 
plainly with a pair of instances when I see double). This cannot in­
deed be proved, but it is absolutely evident and indubitable.42 
For whatever reason, Price seems to suppose that it is just evident to 
him, perhaps given reﬂection on what his experience is like, that 
there must be something there before him.  Hence by reﬂecting on 
what things are beyond serious doubt, he hopes to draw his audi­
ence’s attention to that supposed fact. The grounds of Price’s con­
v i c t i o n s  h e re  a re  n o t  s o  m u c h  e p i s te m o l o g i c a l ,  b u t 
phenomenological.  According to him, the kind of situation one is 
in when one senses is one which just must involve the presence of 
what one is aware of. 
If we apply this to Austin’s example of happening upon the pig, 
then one might suggest that the kind of contact one has with the 
facts here, when pig-presence is just manifest to one, involves just 
the kind of contact with the world which couldn’t be present in a 
case of hallucination. That is, being apprised of pig-presence will 
not be a state of aﬀairs decomposable down into facts in the world 
on the one hand, and some mental state independent of them on the 
other. This is obviously in tension with the view that experience is a 
common kind between perception and hallucination.  For, if that 
were so, then one would have to conclude with Price that the state of 
aﬀairs manifest to one would be non-physical. To resist that conse­
quence, one may then feel impelled to embrace some form of dis­
junctivism: the state of mind one is in when perceiving includes 
what one perceives, and hence is not of a kind which could have oc­
curred were one merely hallucinating. 
This certainly gives us a more substantive content to common 
sense realism in a way that indicates why a kind of disjunctivism 
about perception would seem natural.  But one couldn’t easily at­
tribute these concerns as an underlying motivation for Austin him­
self. For, once one has moved as far as this, then one can no longer 
be satisﬁed with Austin’s analysis of the traditional problem of per­
ception as being one that derives from a concern with incorrigibility. 
The problem on this interpretation has a phenomenological basis 
not principally an epistemological one. Nor would the fact that our 
42. Op. cit., p.. 
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common ways of talking about perception and illusion conﬁrm one 
in the faith that there is nothing to the traditional anxiety.  For the 
worry may arise that the commitments we would end up with as a 
result of reﬂecting on experience cannot be made mutually consist­
ent. One charitable interpretation of the traditional problems of 
perception is as no more than a concern with this. If this is so, then 
in articulating the commitments of common sense realism, Austin 
might ﬁnd himself having to take somewhat more seriously the tra­
ditional challenge of the argument from illusion than he is want to 
do. 
The negative aspects of Austin’s project in Sense & Sensibilia have 
the appearance of success—few now uphold the doctrines that Aus­
tin ridiculed. On closer inspection it is diﬃcult to see how Austin’s 
own position could have more than local signiﬁcance, undermining 
aspects of Ayer’s and Price’s somewhat idiosyncratic views.  I’ve ar­
gued that there is also a positive theme in Austin’s thought, one that 
has origins in Austin’s predecessors, and elements of which can be 
found in some contemporary views of knowledge and perception. 
But there is no simple matching between Austin’s account and any 
of these contemporary views. For to ﬂesh out the common sense re­
alism that links these various philosophers together one has to go 
beyond the concerns that Austin himself thought appropriate, and 
also ﬁnd deeper concerns within the tradition of debate about per­
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